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Mass Mobilization and Regime Change. Evidence From a New Measure of Mobilization for Democracy and Autocracy From 1900 to 2020

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Mass Mobilization and Regime Change.
Evidence From a New Measure of Mobilization for Democracy and Autocracy From 1900 to 2020[*]

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Abstract

Mass mobilization is an important driver of political change. While some citizens organize collective action in favor of more democratic institutions, others take to the streets to support authoritarian leaders or non-democratic forms of governance. In this paper, we introduce latent measures of pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization using expert assessments for 170 polities from 1900-2020. The data allows us to trace patterns in mass mobilization over time, across regions and regime types. We use the new data to systematically analyze the relationship between both types of mobilization and regime change. While we confirm the findings of the large literature on contentious democratic politics, our analysis of autocratic mobilization allows us to help understand the controversy in the literature on "bad" civil society. Our empirical analysis shows that mass mobilization in favor of autocracy negatively affects democracy and reduces the likelihood of democratization. Our results suggest that the extant literature's focus on mobilization generally was perhaps too blunt, and disaggregating the goals of the actors involved in contentious politics helps to understand how protest affects regime change in a more nuanced fashion.

Introduction

In August 2020, tens of thousands of Belarusans took to the streets demanding democratization in response to fraudulent elections.[1] Recently, in Sudan and Armenia similar protests led to regime change but did not produce tangible results in Lebanon or Hong Kong. At the same time, we have also seen citizens on the streets in support of dictatorships – as in North Korea, Syria, or Venezuela – or in favor of reforms undermining democratic rule such as in Brazil or Turkey. What is the role of mass mobilization in stabilizing or changing a political regime? Prior comparative research has produced conflicting answers to this question. Some scholars see citizen activism as crucial to democratization (Schock, 2005; della Porta, 2016; Bratton and van de Walle, 1992), whereas others have pointed out the centrality of citizen engagement to democratic breakdowns (Berman, 1997; Riley, 2010).

From the authors cited above, we know that the character of popular mobilization is critical. The lack of nuance in prior comparative research and the focus on pro-democracy movements has made it difficult to detect those cases in which mass mobilization for autocracy has helped to undermine democracy. As a result, the literature to date has had a difficult time differentiating when mass mobilization can pose a threat to democracy or help to promote it on a more general level. Existing event data sets on mass mobilization are of limited temporal and geographic scope and not all allow for a classification of events as pro-democratic or pro-autocratic.

Therefore, the V-Dem data set version 11 (Coppedge et al., 2021a) is the first to provide time-series cross-national data (1900-2020) to gauge the degree of pro- and anti-democratic mass mobilization in around 170 countries.[2] Based on the knowledge of local country experts, we build comparable latent measures of mass mobilization across space and time. We compare our measures with existing data on related phenomena and find a substantial overlap for subsamples of the data. Our descriptive data analysis shows, among other things, that pro-democratic mass mobilization has been increasing over the last century, reaching its peak in 2019. Pro-autocratic mobilization, by contrast, was highest during the Cold War and the heyday of communism in Eastern Europe. Whereas pro-democratic mass mobilization is most frequent in regimes with intermediate levels of democracy, pro-autocratic mass mobilization is common in closed and electoral autocracies.

In the empirical part of the paper, we use this expert-coded data to investigate the relationship between mass mobilization for different goals and subsequent regime change.

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[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/30/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-protests.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/18/belarus-protests-who-are-the-key-players-and-what-do-they-want

[2] The data was released for the first time with version 10 of the V-Dem data. We do not provide complete time series for all polities over the 120 year period.

We consider the regime of a country to change, if the quality of its democratic institutions changes substantially as measured in V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (Teorell et al., 2019). Building on Dahl (1971), this index reflects an ambitious notion of democracy, which not only concerns free and fair elections, but also the guarantees that make such elections meaningful such as freedom of association, speech and the media. Our analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, we analyze the effect of mass mobilization on changes in the overall level of democracy in a standard panel setting. In the second part, we look at the *outcome* of regime transformation such as democratic transition and democratic breakdown episodes, building on recent advances in the conceptualization and measurement of regime change (Maerz et al., 2021).

Our initial results show robust relationships between mass mobilization and regime transformations. Pro-democratic mass mobilization is associated with an increase in the quality of democracy. Moreover, we find that pro-democratic mass mobilization during democratization episodes makes a successful transition more likely. By contrast, pro-autocratic mobilization reduces democratic quality and increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown. Our results add empirical evidence to ongoing discussions of the role of citizens in regime transformations.

Civil Society and Regime Change

It is readily acknowledged that civil society is intrinsic to democracy. Further it is compatible, though subject often to more limiting constraints, with many forms of non-democratic rule (Bermeo and Nord, 2000). The pro-democratic mobilization of civil society is seen as necessary for extending authoritarian liberalization into democratic transition (Przeworski et al., 1999; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). While such classic theories locate the origin of liberalization-democratization sequences in splits within the authoritarian ruling coalition, others have argued that such splits can be triggered by the activism of the citizenry from below (Adler and Webster, 1995; Schock, 2005; della Porta, 2016; Hudáková, 2019; Bratton and van de Walle, 1992; Kim, 2000; Johnson and Thyne, 2018).

The institutionalization of civil society under democracy is understood as one of the fundamental tasks of overcoming the legacies of authoritarianism and constructing durable democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996). The literature on democracy-building in countries with totalitarian legacies attests to the complexities of this daunting task when civil society has been abolished for a substantial period of time prior to democratization (Howard, 2003; Fish, 1996; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2013; Vachudová, 2005; Bernhard and Karakoç, 2007). The importance of this task has been confirmed by both behavioral and institutional approaches to questions of civil society and democracy.

Another stream in the literature finds a strong link between the kind of civil society

institutionalization necessary for effective democratization and the role of civil society in transition. There is now a substantial set of findings that argue that a more contentious transition from authoritarianism involving the mobilization of pro-democratic civil society forces leads to higher quality and more durable democracies in the post-transition era (Brancati, 2016; della Porta, 2014; Bernhard et al., 2017; Kadivar, 2018). Pinckney (2020) argues that civil society mobilization does not necessarily lead to democratic outcomes, but that when contentious action is moderate rather than maximalist in nature this has a salutary effect on democratization. Haggard and Kaufman (2016) note a similar effect for transitions that involve labor mobilization. In a paired comparison of Spain and Portugal, Fishman (2019) finds that the contentious events of the Portuguese Revolution led to higher quality democracy than the classically pacted transition in Spain. Drawing on examples from Africa, Yarwood (2016) demonstrates that an active civil society can be effective at preventing power grabs from incumbent presidents.

There is a long tradition in behavioral research on values and attitudes, dating back to Almond and Verba (1972) that investigates the mechanisms at the micro- and meso-level that link civic engagement with durable democracy. Some scholars argue that active engagement in civic organizations promotes generalized social trust, which in turn improves the performance of democratic institutions and overall satisfaction with democracy (Putnam et al., 1994). Where engagement is more limited, trust tends to be placed in private networks, diminishing satisfaction with democratic institutions (Letki, 2004; Letki and Evans, 2005). Other scholars emphasize the importance social values for the durability of democratic institutions and the deepening of democracy. The theory posits that there are configurations of values that are more congruent with the practice of democracy (postmaterialist, self-expression values, emancipative). Such values have been connected to engagement of new social movements which seek incorporate and empower previously marginalized populations into full participation in democratic politics. Thus an active and evolving civil society can play an essential role in maintaining and improving the level of democracy (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2011; Welzel, 2013).

From an institutional point of view it has been argued that a well-developed civil society promotes the durability of democracy. Such views are predicated on the notion that democracy functions as a self-enforcing equilibrium where the political actors can effectively sanction each other when one violates the rules of democracy (Przeworski, 1991; North et al., 2000). In such models the ability to enforce democracy is based on systemic accountability. The most common form of accountability discussed in the literature is vertical, which is produced by the ability of the electorate to vote incumbents out of power. Also of critical importance is the horizontal accountability produced by the ability of different parts of the government to monitor and, if need be, sanction, other parts for overstepping constitutional restraints on their exercise of power (Przeworski et al., 1999; O'Donnell, 1998; Lindberg, 2013). Where civil society comes into this is in a

third but often less appreciated form of constraint that produces what has been labeled social or diagonal accountability (Bernhard et al., 2020; Hegre et al., 2020; Lührmann et al., 2020). This third form of accountability can be directly exercised by contentious forms of politics that impose audience costs on the incumbents, other forms of direct action (e.g., lawsuits, social work with those adversely effected by state action or failure) or indirectly by the actions of civil society organizations (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000; Cornell and Grimes, 2015).

There is strong empirical evidence to support the contention that civil society generated forms of accountability help to strengthen democracy. In separate samples that examine its effects from 1900 to the present (Bernhard et al., 2020) and in the interwar era (Cornell et al., 2020), a period where democracy was particularly fragile, recent studies have found that an organizationally active civil society made democracy more durable. In a related study Edgell and Bernhard (2019) also found that a novel measure of civil society stock was associated with higher levels of democracy, increases in the level of democracy, and made democracies more resistant to downturns in democracy scores.

From this perspective one might be tempted to conclude that civil society is not only necessary for democracy, but that it is the key to successful democratization and the durability of democratic regimes. However, civil society can develop in a problematic fashion for democracy. A number of observers have pointed out that civil society includes actors who are hostile to democracy and take an active role in trying to overthrow it (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Kopecký, 2003). Can such organizations pose a threat to democracy or are they a relatively harmless downside of civil society?

In the literature on the generalized failure of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar period there is strong evidence in several cases that civil society, if not at the heart of democratic breakdown, played a critical role. In her work on Weimar Germany, Berman (1997) argues that a highly developed civil society in Germany abetted the Nazi seizure of power. She argues that the Nazis were able to infiltrate and take control of substantial parts of the densely organized network of civic organizations in Germany, increasing their support and weakening the social basis of other parties. In a variation on this argument Riley (2010) argues that the growth in civil society abetted the rise of fascism in Italy, Spain and Romania. His argument is that the liberal parties that dominated politics in these societies were unable to effectively organize hegemony over newly emergent social constituencies and their failure to do so opened them up to organization by the emerging fascist movements in all three countries.

With a somewhat different emphasis, Bermeo (2003) shows that elite exploitation of social tensions and contentious political behavior was a key driver of 20 democratic breakdowns in the 20th century despite the fact that grass-roots activism and popular attitudes were more often in favor of democracy than its overthrow. Despite her differences from Berman and Riley, she does see that mass mobilization can play a role in justifying

elite action directed at undermining democracy.

Furthermore, there are parallels between the interwar period and the current period of democratic backsliding. Research on the ongoing episodes of autocratization in Poland and Hungary shows that the accession to power of populist parties has been abetted by the development of civil society organizations and protest activity by their followers (Greskovits, 2020; Gerő and Kopper, 2013; Ślarzyński, 2018). In authoritarian regimes, mass mobilization in support of the incumbent government is quite common; particularly, when the regime's survival is at stake (Hellmeier and Weidmann, 2020).

Statistical evidence on the potential danger of civil society activism for democracy is scarce. The two studies that found evidence that active civil societies helped to protect democracy from breakdown (Bernhard et al., 2020; Cornell et al., 2020) explicitly tried to find such conditions by looking at whether the failure of the party system to effectively channel civic activism and demands, as suggested by both Berman (1997) and Riley (2010), was the source of such threats. However, neither study found supporting evidence. The one study that has found supportive empirical evidence is Edgell and Bernhard (2019) which examines the impact of anti-system movement strength on variants of the V-Dem democracy indices. Generally speaking they find that the presence of anti-system movements intensifies both upward and downward movement in democracy scores, but that right-wing movements drive the results for democratic downturns.

These findings and the careful casework by authors like Berman (1997) and Riley (2010) suggest that it is not the existence of civil society itself but the character of organizations present or their activity that drives regime outcomes. Until now we have not had data that was detailed enough data to capture the conditions under which it can constitute a threat to democracy. This lack of nuance has made it difficult to detect those cases in which anti-democratic activism has helped to undermine democracy and may explain why the literature to date has had a difficult time understanding the conditions under which the mobilization of civil society actors can pose a threat to democracy or help to promote it on a more general level. The data we introduce in this paper allows, for the first time, to gauge the degree of pro- and anti-democratic mobilization in civil society and to analyze its effect on regime change statistically.

How Mass Mobilization Affects Regime Change

In the analysis that follows we concentrate on the contentious politics dimension of civil society. This stands in contrast to other studies that have looked at organizational density or other collective attributes gauged through survey research that function as proxies. We proceed from the idea that conflict between partisans of authoritarian and democratic movements is a common facet of episodes of regime change. The outcome of episodes that have the potential to bring down and replace the existing regime include mobilization and

countermobilization by forces promoting and resisting a change of the system of rule. The balance of forces at such junctures plays an important role in determining the outcome of such episodes as well promote regime stability. Therefore, we argue that mobilization in support for democracy may enhance democratization and democratic stability while mobilization for autocracy has the opposite effects.

What is the basis for our expectations on the micro-level? What mechanisms motivate citizens to take the kind of protest actions that have the potential to lead to regime change? Public demonstrations are a way of signaling preferences to both other members of the public, incumbents, and the counterelites that challenge incumbent authority. Collective action directed towards regime change, no matter the regime in question, is inherently dangerous because of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. While peaceful protest is often less dangerous in democracies than autocracies, it does entail greater risks than other forms of political action, especially when it transcends the boundaries of legality. Under authoritarian conditions, especially when the state aggressively defends its monopoly on organization, any public expression of discontent is inherently dangerous.

A well-established theoretical literature has shown how protest as a form of signaling reveals hidden preferences and changes the calculus of individuals on whether to engage in collective action because there is strength in numbers (Granovetter, 1978; DeNardo, 1985; Marwell and Oliver, 1993). It is more difficult and costlier for any regime to punish large numbers of protestors. Under conditions of uncertainty about the preferences of one's fellow citizens, it takes bravery, a high level of moral commitment, or even recklessness to engage in protest, especially when a regime has an integral and obedient coercive apparatus at its disposal. Each incremental successful protest has the possibility to expand opposition to the incumbent by revealing new information to others who have been hiding their antipathy towards the regime (Lohmann, 1994; Kuran, 1991).

Further, the size and intensity of protest, potentially raises the costs of repression to the regime, both materially, and in terms of the audience costs. Repression, when seen as excessive, works to create further pockets of antipathy towards the incumbents. When this occurs, reform as a response to popular disquiet may become the more attractive option for the incumbents. And with reform, come enhanced prospects for regime change (Przeworski, 1991). Finally, counterelites may become emboldened in terms of their demands and actions if collective action reveals greater disquiet with incumbent rule.

Our models also introduce a new level of complexity into the conceptualization of the problem. We measure and simultaneously incorporate the effects of pro-democratic and anti-democratic protest. This allows us to control for the efforts of regime supporters, whether self-organized or mobilized from above, to signal their support for the incumbents. This action may also influence whether those hiding their preferences and abstaining from action make the decision to engage in collective action with those who

share those preferences. Thus, we expect pro- and anti-democratic demonstrations potentially to affect regime outcome by revealing the preferences of citizens, which in turn will affect the behavior of fellow citizens and shape the calculations of both incumbents and the counterelites that oppose them.

We will thus test the following hypotheses about the effect of different types of mass mobilization on regime transformations:

H1a: *Mobilization in support of democracy leads to higher levels of democracy.*

H1b: *During liberalization episodes, mobilization in support of democracy (autocracy) increases the probability of a successful (unsuccessful) democratic transition.*

H2a: *Mobilization in support of autocracy leads to lower levels of democracy.*

H2b: *During democratic regression episodes, mobilization in support of autocracy (democracy) increases the probability of (averted) democratic breakdown.*

New Data on Mass Mobilization

Analyzing the relationship between mass mobilization and subsequent regime transformations requires comprehensive data on both phenomena. Several large datasets on the quality of political institutions such as Polity, Freedom House and V-Dem exist and allow us to identify moments of regime transformations across time and space. When it comes to mass mobilization, however, there is less data available. While there are numerous event data sets on mass mobilization, existing data are not well suited for our investigation for two main reasons. First, due to the scarcity of source material such as media reports or social media posts, most protest data sets lack the temporal and geographic coverage needed to analyze regime transformations comprehensively. For instance, the Mass Mobilization (MM) (Clark and Regan, 2016) protest database covers the years from 1990 to 2020 and Brancati (2016) provides information on about 300 democracy protests between 1989 and 2011. If we limit our analysis to the post-Cold War period, we would have to exclude many regime transformations that occurred during the three waves of democratization described by Huntington (1993). Other comprehensive datasets like the Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Database (MMAD) (Weidmann and Rød, 2019; Keremoğlu et al., 2020) cover only a subtype of political regimes (autocracies) and impede, for

example, the analysis of pro-autocratic mobilization that occurred in (electoral) democracies like Brazil or Poland.

Second, most event data sets comprise protest events with very diverse claims and issues for protest. For example, MM focuses on anti-state protests and defines protest "as a gathering of 50 or more people to make a demand of the government". We are interested in a specific subtype of protest events — protests in favor of democracy or in support of authoritarianism. Although it is possible to identify a relevant subset of events by looking at protesters' demands — one of the optional protest issues in the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al., 2012), for instance, is "democracy, human rights" and MM has the broad category "political behavior/processes" — we are not aware of a dataset that has information on both pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mobilization and that covers a large number of countries over more than the last thirty years.[3]

We, therefore, collected new data on pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization. From our perspective, it is not feasible to compile reliable and comparable (social) media reports — the data basis for the vast majority of existing data sets — on protest events for the period before the end of the Cold War and for a large sample of countries. Therefore, we surveyed experts and asked them to estimate the size and frequency of mass mobilization instead. Our survey was fielded as part of the annual cycle of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) expert survey (Coppedge et al., 2021a) that leverages the knowledge of country experts to collect information on a large number of political variables.[4] To measure mobilization for democracy and autocracy, we asked country experts to rate the frequency and size of events of political mass mobilization, such as demonstrations, strikes, protests, riots, and sit–ins for each year.[5] To ensure that experts have a shared understanding of what we mean by pro-democratic and pro-autocratic aims, we clarify these concepts in the survey. Pro-democratic events are organized to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections, courts and

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[3]See Keremoğlu et al. (2021) for an attempt to infer protest issues from topic models.

[4]The "Civic and Academic Space" survey was fielded for the first time in version 10 of the larger V-Dem survey. In this paper, we rely on data from V11.

[5]The exact wording was: "In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic/pro-autocratic aims been?" (See V-Dem codebook (Coppedge et al., 2021b, p.228))

parliaments, or in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech. Pro-autocratic aims include supporting non-democratic rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy or aim to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom (Coppedge et al., 2021b, 228). Each expert was asked to rate the frequency and size of this kind of mass mobilization on an ordinal scale from "virtually no events" (0) to "many large-scale and small-scale events" (4).

The expert ratings were then processed by a Bayesian item response theory measurement model to take into account different thresholds across experts and measurement error (Pemstein et al., 2021). Our final dataset contains estimates of latent pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization at the country-year level for around 170 polities from 1900 to 2020.[6] While the data cannot be used to analyze subnational or short-term mobilization dynamics within a country, we will demonstrate that it is well suited for studying regime transformations where the country year is the main unit of analysis. In the following section, we compare our data to existing data sets in order to validate our measure.

Comparison with existing data

When comparing our data to alternative data sources on mass mobilization, we encountered two fundamental challenges related to concepts and measurement. First, there is a lack of conceptual overlap with regards to the type of mobilization and disparate units of analysis. Many data sets compile mobilization events with a broad set of claims, while we are only interested in a specific subset of demands (pro-democracy/pro-autocracy). Most do not record protests in favor of an authoritarian regime and focus on anti-government activities. Even though these data allow for filtering based on claims made by protesters, there is no full conceptual overlap between our data and existing data. Second, the unit

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[6]We excluded countries that were coded by less than three experts. However, we aim to collect data for these countries during the next round of the V-Dem annual survey. We do not have complete time series for all polities.

of analysis varies across data sets. Many data sets contain individual protest events with information on actors, goals, and tactics. Others such as the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2) data project operate at the campaign-year level (Chenoweth et al., 2018). Our expert ratings are available at the country-year level.

Given the differences between our approach and other work, we expect only a partial overlap with alternative data sources. In the following, we benchmark our data against four related data sets: NAVCO 2.1 (Chenoweth et al., 2018) on violent and nonviolent campaigns (campaign-year), pro-democracy protests (country-year) collected by Brancati (2016), the MMAD (Weidmann and Rød, 2019) that includes protest events against and in favor of authoritarian governments, and Carnegie's Global Protest Tracker (Carothers and Wong, 2020).[7]

NAVCO 2.1 provides information about nonviolent and violent mass movements (1945-2013) at the campaign-year level. We retain only campaigns aiming at regime change, institutional reform and policy change to maximize conceptual overlap. We then dichotomize our measurement of mass mobilization for democracy to identify country years with at least several small-scale events ($v2cademmob\_ord > 0$) and assess the intersection between our measure and NAVCO. The mosaic plot (Zeileis et al., 2007) in Figure 1 shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between both measures. Our data on mobilization for democracy register pro-democratic mobilization events for 990 out of 1,215 (81%) campaign years. As expected, there are many country years (5,249) with at least some pro-democratic mobilization events that occur outside NAVCO campaigns. Given NAVCO's more restrictive inclusion criteria they fall short of being classified as a campaign.[8]

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[7]For each data source, we investigate overlapping subsamples of our data and the respective comparison data. Most comparisons focus on pro-democratic mobilization since fewer data on pro-autocratic mobilization is available. We use the "original scale" (Coppedge et al., 2021b, 31) version of the mass mobilization variables for the descriptive part of our analysis to facilitate the interpretation.

[8]See https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco for the full data and codebook.

Figure 1: Overlap between mobilization for democracy (*v2cademmob_ ord* > 0) and NAVCO 2.1 data (Chenoweth et al., 2018). Mosaic plots with colors indicating significant departure of independence at the 90% and 99% level.


Figure 2: Overlap between mobilization for democracy (*v2cademmob_ ord* > 0) and data by Brancati (2016). Mosaic plots with colors indicating significant departure of independence at the 90% and 99% level.

Figure 2 shows the overlap between the occurrence of one or more pro-democracy protests in a given country-year as compiled by Brancati (2016) and our expert estimates. On a conceptual level, her approach comes closest to our operationalization of pro-democracy events, although her definition is more restrictive and focuses mostly on events related to elections.[9] Both measures overlap to a large extent. For 232 country-years with pro-democracy protests in Brancati's data, we record at least some mobilization events. There are only 18 cases in Brancati's data for which we record no events. Notably, we observe pro-democracy events in many country-years (2,261) where Brancati's data does not register any event. We believe that these differences are partially explained by our broader understanding of what counts as pro-democracy mobilization and what does not.

Next, we compare our data to recent protest event data on authoritarian regimes. The MMAD (Weidmann and Rød, 2019) consists of more than 16,000 protest events and relies on multiple news outlets, including translated local sources. The data is one of the few sources that includes pro-government mobilization allowing us to include our measure of pro-autocratic mobilization in the comparison. To compare the frequency and size of protests to our measures of mass mobilization, we aggregate participant numbers across all events in the MMAD at the yearly level. Figure 3 shows the correlation between (logged) participant numbers and pro-democratic (.39, top) and pro-autocratic (.34, bottom) mass mobilization. The Appendix includes timelines with both measures for Venezuela and Tunisia (Figure A.2 and Figure A.1). Given that the MMAD is not limited to protests with pro-democratic or pro-autocratic aims and both are measured on very different scales, we find the moderate correlations between our measure and the aggregated MMAD data encouraging.

Finally, we merge our dataset with the Global Protest Tracker by Carnegie (Carothers and Wong, 2020) that offers background information on major protest events, mostly

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[9]Brancati defines democracy protests as "mass public demonstrations in which the participants demand countries adopt or uphold democratic elections" (Brancati, 2016, 5) and thus follows a minimum definition of democracy.

Figure 3: Top: correlation between mobilization for democracy (*v2cademmob_osp*) and participant numbers at anti-government protests in authoritarian regimes as recorded in the MMAD. Bottom: Correlation between mobilization for autocracy (*v2caautmob_osp*) and participant numbers at pro-government protests.

against incumbent governments.[10] Since our experts provide their estimates at the yearly level, we have no information about the real-world events that they considered in their assessment of pro-democratic or pro-autocratic mobilization. The comparison with specific movements provides some insights into their evaluation process. Figure 4 shows the ten major protest events from Carnegie for which we record the highest (right panel) and lowest (left panel) estimates of mobilization for democracy.[11] Our data shows high values for the mass movement against Lukashenko in Belarus (2020), the Armenian revolution

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[10]The data is available at https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker. We use data from 2017 to 2020.

[11]Given that most protests tracked by Carnegie are anti-government, we cannot make a similar comparison with pro-autocratic mobilization.

Figure 4: Events listed in the Carnegie Global Protest Tracker (2017-2020) with lowest (left panel) and highest (right panel) scores for pro-democratic mass mobilization. X-axis cut off for visualization purposes.

in 2018 and the major protests in Venezuela that demanded the resignation of authoritarian president Nicolás Maduro. For all events, the experts agreed on the pro-democratic nature of mass mobilization as illustrated by the small confidence intervals.

For other major protests in the Carnegie data, our data reports only low levels of pro-democratic mobilization (left panel). In these cases, the experts did not classify protesters' aims as pro-democratic according to our definition. The list shows events — mostly in already democratic countries like Spain, Japan or Uruguay — targeting specific policy areas such as corruption, corona measures and unemployment. Such events do not meet our criteria for pro-democratic aims and should not be classified as pro-democratic mobilization. However, there are borderline cases where the "pro-democraticness" of protests is debatable, such as the protests for racial equality in New Zealand in 2020. The wider confidence intervals in Figure 4 suggest that experts did not fully agree on some of the cases.

Overall, the comparison with existing data conveys a substantial overlap with similar measurement approaches. These findings increase our trust in the experts' understanding of our definition of mobilization for democracy and the measure as a whole.

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Data description

After comparing our new measure to alternative data sources, we summarize several insights from a descriptive analysis in the following section. Figure 5 and Figure 6 map spatial variation of the most recent data on pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization for 2020. The maps show high levels of mass mobilization for democracy in several countries despite the Covid-19 pandemic. Many large and small events occurred in authoritarian regimes such as Belarus, Thailand, and Sudan. However, mobilization for democracy swept through democratic countries, too. The Black Lives Matter movement in the U.S. demanded equal political participation of marginalized groups. In Nigeria, activists protested police brutality within the context of the #endSARS movement. Pro-democratic mass mobilization took also place in democracies like Poland, where citizens mobilized in opposition to autocratic tendencies. Compared to that, our data shows lower absolute levels of mobilization for autocracy (see Figure 6) during the first year of the pandemic. We observe the highest levels of mobilization in totalitarian North Korea and in Nicaragua, where supporters of increasingly authoritarian looking Ortega attacked opposition activists.

Figure 5: Mass mobilization for democracy around the world in 2020. Measurement model estimates of original scale value from "virtually no events" (0) to "many large-scale and small-scale events" (4). Countries with missing data in grey.

Figure 7 summarizes the average size of both types of mass mobilization over time. Over the last century, we have observed an increasing trend for pro-democratic mass mobilization. Spikes in mass mobilization occurred after both World Wars, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and around the Arab uprisings at the beginning of the 2010s. Pro-democratic mass mobilization peaks in 2019, the year that, according to scholars, "may have been the largest wave of mass, nonviolent antigovernment movements in recorded history" (Chenoweth, 2020, 69). Pro-autocratic mass mobilization, however, has taken a different turn. While it steadily increased up until the 1970s, our data shows a substantial downturn coinciding with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Over the past two decades, we see a slight but sustained increase in pro-autocratic mobilization. Overall, our data suggest that from a global perspective, except for the 1970s, pro-democratic mass mobilization was more frequent over the last century, and especially since the late 1980s.

Figure 8 breaks down levels of mass mobilization by region from 1900 to 2019.[12] The plots reveal striking differences across regions. For instance, pro-autocratic mobilization

Figure 6: Mass mobilization for autocracy around the world in 2020. Ordinal scale from "virtually no events" (0) to "many large-scale and small-scale events" (4). Countries with missing data in grey.

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[12]We use the sixfold classification scheme for world regions as given by the variables *e_regionpol_6C* in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2021a).

Figure 7: Average mobilization for democracy (solid blue line) and mobilization for autocracy (dashed red line) over time.

was very high during the period of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In many socialist regimes, scheduled demonstrations supporting the political system were a regular part of political life. In Latin America, the heydays of pro-democracy mobilization were in the 1980s when people rose against the military dictatorships in the region. Our data also captures the high levels of pro-autocratic mobilization around the rise of fascism in Western Europe during the inter-war period.

How do the two types of mass mobilization differ across political regimes? Figure 9 plots levels of mass mobilization against the quality of democratic institutions measured by V-Dem's electoral democracy index (EDI) that is based on Dahl's concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1971). With regards to pro-democratic mass mobilization, the plot supports the notion of the so-called "murder in the middle" (Fein, 1995) hypothesis: we observe the highest mobilization levels in countries with modest levels of democracy (hybrid regimes). In closed autocracies, civil society is usually repressed and there is little opportunity for protest. By contrast, in liberal democracies, citizens can use other channels of participation to voice their political demands. The relationship between mobilization for autocracy

Figure 8: Smoothed regional levels of pro-democracy (blue solid line) and pro-autocracy mobilization (red dashed line) over time.

and democratic quality shows a similar inverted-U relationship, although more skewed to the right. It is most widespread in countries with low levels of democracy and becomes less frequent the more democratic a given country is.

The descriptive analysis of the data yielded several insights. First, mass mobilization for democracy is usually more common than pro-autocratic mobilization. Over the last century, our data shows a trend towards increasing levels of pro-democratic mobilization. In contrast, pro-autocratic mobilization dropped markedly with the downfall of socialist regimes in the former Soviet bloc. While pro-democratic mass mobilization is highest in states with intermediate levels of democracy, pro-autocratic mobilization is most prevalent in closed and electoral autocracies.

Mass mobilization and regime transformations

In the final part of the paper, we use the new data to shed light on the relationship between mass mobilization and regime transformations in the world. The data analysis consists

Figure 9: Relationship between pro-democracy (left panel) / pro-autocratic (right panel) mobilization and levels of democracy (low to high). Locally weighted smoothing. Shaded areas represent .95 confidence intervals.

of two parts. In the first part, we use standard panel models with mass mobilization (at time t) as the independent variable and the quality of democracy (at time t+1) as the dependent variable. In the second part, we build on recent advancements in the conceptualization and operationalization of regime transformations (Maerz et al., 2021) to estimate the effect of mass mobilization on the outcome of episodes democratization and autocratization episodes. In the following, we describe the design of our statistical analysis and the results.

Mobilization and the quality of democracy

How does mass mobilization affect the quality of democratic institutions? To answer this question, we organize our data in a standard panel framework with the country year as the unit of analysis. To measure democracy, we rely on V-Dem's widely used electoral democracy index (EDI). The EDI is built after Dahl's (1971) concept of Polyarchy and captures de-jure as well as de-facto prerequisites for a democracy such as functioning electoral institutions and media freedom. Figure 10 summarizes the bivariate relationship between mobilization and changes in the EDI. The horizontal axes show the size and frequency of mobilization events (t-1) and the vertical axes indicate EDI change in the following year (t). The different colors and linetypes represent regime types based on

the Regimes of the World (RoW) ([Lührmann et al., 2018]) coding scheme. As the plot shows, there is a positive relationship between mobilization for democracy and the quality of democracy in closed and electoral autocracies. Very frequent and large events are associated with a 1 to 2 per cent improvement in democratic quality. We do not find this association in already democratic regimes. Conversely, mobilization for autocracy is followed by declines in democracy, as shown in the right panel in Figure 10. We observe the steepest declines of democracy in the aftermath of pro-autocratic mobilization in regimes located in the middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum (hybrid regimes).

Figure 10: Relationship between mass mobilization and subsequent quality of democracy across RoW regime types.

To substantiate these descriptive findings, we systematically investigate the relationship between mobilization and democracy in a regression framework. We include a comprehensive set of control variables in our model to reduce concerns of omitted variable bias. The controls comprise economic, social as well as institutional variables that could be common causes of mass mobilization and regime transformations. With regards to economic factors, we include gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to measure economic development, the GDP growth rate ([Bold et al., 2018]) and the amount of gas

Figure 11: Main results: Model coefficients (left panel) including all control variables and effect plot (right panel). 95% confidence intervals. Full regression table shown in the Appendix (Table A.1). Marginal effects (right panel) based on pooled models.

and oil production (Ross and Mahdavi, 2015) to capture a country's resource wealth. In addition, we add information on the average years of education (Barro and Lee, 2013) and population size (Bold et al., 2018). Since societies with ongoing conflicts are more likely to experience mass mobilization and are often governed by unstable regimes, we include binary indicators for civil conflict from UCDP (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson et al., 2019) as well as an index of ethnic fractionalization (Drazanova, 2019). Finally, we include measures for the incumbent leader's power base (military, ruling party, monarchy) to account for fundamental structural differences between authoritarian regimes (Teorell and Lindberg, 2019). All variables are lagged by one year.[13]

The results from four different panel models (Croissant and Millo, 2008) are summarized in Figure 11 (and Table A.1) and include pooled, two-way (country-year) fixed effects, first differences and lagged dependent variable models (left panel). All models show a statistically significant relationship in line with our theoretical expectations (H1a and H2a). Mass mobilization for democracy is associated with higher subsequent levels of democracy, while mobilization for autocracy is associated with less democracy. As ex-

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[13]We run robustness tests including additional confounders such as latent measures of respect for human rights (Fariss, 2014), elections and coup attempts (Bell et al., 2020). The results are summarized in Table A.4.

pected, the models that include lagged levels of democracy — a slowly changing variable — as a predictor yield smaller coefficients than the pooled or fixed-effects models.

The marginal effect plots (Lüdecke, 2017) (right panel) suggest that the effect of mass mobilization is substantive. A massive eruption of protest with frequent large and small events is associated with an increase of about 8% in democracy, or a decrease of up to 21% respectively. Whereas effect sizes vary by model specification, all models show evidence for the relevance of mass mobilization for changes in the quality of democracy. Our results hold when controlling for repression and watershed events like coups or elections (see Table A.4 in the Appendix).[14]

Mobilization and episodes of regime transformations

The first part of the empirical analysis has shown a relationship between mobilization and continuous measures of democracy. However, we do not know yet whether mobilization matters for substantive political change, for instance, during democratization episodes or instances of democratic breakdown. Therefore, the second part of the analysis zooms in on these crucial moments of political change. We build on recent advances in the conceptualization and operationalization of episodes of regime transformations (ERT) by Maerz et al. (2021) that emphasize the gradual and incremental nature of regime changes. Today, democracies break down at the hands of leaders that systematically dismantle accountability over a sustained period of time. Similarly, mass uprisings that lead to the removal of a dictator do not always end with democratization. Recent events in Sudan demonstrate the uncertainty around the outcome of potential episodes of democratic transitions. The ERT data set identifies the starting point based on substantial and sustained increases or decreases in electoral democracy measured by V-Dem's EDI. Every episode starts with an initial increase/decrease of 0.01 on the EDI and a total change of at least 0.1 points over the course of the episode.[15]

For the second part of the analysis, we draw on the ERT's definition of episode

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[14]Due to multicollinearity concerns, we do not include these variables in our main models.

[15]For more information on the operationalization of episodes and technical details, see the data and codebook at `https://github.com/vdeminstitute/ERT`.

outcomes. Each episode can either end in regime change or not. For example, among all democracies that experienced autocratization, some eventually broke down while others managed to avert breakdown (see South Korea 2008 - 2016 for an example). Likewise, some countries that started democratizing held free and fair elections and became electoral or liberal democracies, whereas others reverted to autocracy (Edgell et al., 2021). To analyze how mass mobilization affects the final outcome of regime transformations, we aggregate all data at the episode level and use the episode outcome as the dependent variable.[16] We run separate models for episodes of liberalization in authoritarian regimes (n = 338) and democratic regressions (n = 66) and use the manifestation of a regime transformation to democracy (or autocracy) as the dependent variable (0/1).

Figure 12: Mean mobilization intensity during liberalization episodes by episode outcome.

Figure 12 and Figure 13 provide a descriptive summary of our findings. The plots show the distribution of mass mobilization for democracy (left panel) and for autocracy (right panel) by episode outcome. On average, "successful" democratization episodes are characterized by higher levels of mobilization for democracy and lower levels of pro-

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[16]We take the mean level of mobilization during the episode for all models in the main text. We also used maximum levels of mobilization and find similar results.

Figure 13: Mean mobilization intensity during democratic regression episodes by episode outcome.

autocratic mobilization. Mobilization patterns during liberalization episodes in Spain (1976-1980) and Thailand (2008-2012) illustrate this finding. Figure 13 shows a similar pattern for phases of democratic regression. Autocratization episodes that end with democratic breakdown see less mobilization for democracy and more pro-autocratic mass protests. The cases of Turkey (2005-2020), where democracy broke down according to the ERT data and South Korea (2008-2014) where a breakdown was averted exemplify these dynamics.

We run additional logistic regression models with bias reduction (Kosmidis et al., 2020; Kosmidis, 2020) to check if these relationships between mobilization and episode outcome hold when taking confounding factors into account. In addition to the controls mentioned before (GDP, population, conflict), we include information on the duration of the episode in years and a non-linear time trend.[17]

The results are summarized in Figure 14 (democratization episodes) and Figure 15

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[17]Due to the low number of cases, we do not include year dummies in the model. When we add the complete set of control variables, our sample size decreases to 239 democratization and 50 autocratization episodes.

Figure 14: Relationship between mass mobilization and democratization. Full regression table shown in the Appendix (Table A.2).

(autocratization episodes). We find that mobilization for democracy is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of a successful democratic transition. This relationship is consistent across model specifications, for instance, when adjusting for episode features such as duration, country dummies or additional variables. By contrast, mobilization for autocracy makes democratization less likely. Once we include country dummies, the uncertainty around the estimates increases and the results are not statistically significant. We suspect that this is due to the fact that most variation is between countries and not within a single country. The right panel in Figure 14 underscores the relevance of mobilization. The chance of a successful democratic transition is only 25% without mass mobilization for democracy and doubles to almost 50% if large-scale and frequent events occur during the transition period. By contrast, high levels of mobilization for autocracy are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of transition.

The picture is less clear for autocratization periods (see Figure 15). We do not find that mobilization for democracy is associated with a reduced likelihood of democratic breakdown. However, mobilization for autocracy is related to democratic breakdown at the 10% level. The uncertainty around these estimates is due to the low number of democratic regression episodes and we are cautious not to put too much emphasis on these findings. Given that several democratic regressions are ongoing during today's "third wave of autocratization" (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019), our analysis will provide

Figure 15: Relationship between mass mobilization and democratic breakdown. Full regression table shown in the Appendix (Table A.3).

more efficient estimates once we know the outcome of these episodes.

To summarize, our new measure of mass mobilization is related to democracy in several ways. Using a continuous measure of democratic quality, we find that pro-democratic mass mobilization is associated with an increase of democratic quality and that mobilization for autocracy is associated with a decrease in democracy. These results support our core hypothesis that mass mobilization is not *per se* good or bad for democracy. Instead, we need to pay attention to the goals put forward by different social movements and actors in civil society. While this observational study does not allow for causal claims, the observed relationships are robust to several model specifications and the inclusion of a number of potential confounding factors.

Conclusion

Citizens play a crucial rule in regime transformations. Mass mobilization can overthrow incumbent rulers and trigger democratization. However, mass movements do not always follow pro-democratic aims. In some cases, mobilization is directed against democracy and in favor of authoritarian rulers. In this paper, we shed light on the relationship between mass mobilization and regime transformations. Our new expert-coded data on pro-autocratic and pro-democratic mass mobilization showed considerable variation

across time and space. Whereas pro-democratic mass mobilization has been steadily increasing over the last century, pro-autocratic mobilization declined with the collapse of the Soviet Union. We record highest levels of mobilization in regimes in the middle of the autocracy-democracy continuum.

Our empirical analyses showed robust relationships between mass mobilization and regime transformations. Pro-democratic mobilization leads to an increase in democratic quality and raises the chance of a successful democratic transition. Pro-autocratic mobilization, by contrast, is associated with lower levels of democracy and makes democratization less likely. These findings shed light on the phenomenon of "bad" civil society. Who protests and to what end is crucial for understanding whether popular participation and contention has a positive or negative impact on democracy.

While our analysis of democratic regression episodes is based on a low number of cases, initial results do not suggest that pro-democratic mobilization prevents backsliding. These findings complement existing empirical research using a new data source with broad geographical and temporal coverage. We show that movements' goals are important in understanding the political consequences of mass mobilization. Beyond that, the data will be useful for scholars who study mass mobilization or those in need of control variables for mass mobilization across time and space.

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Appendix

Figure A.1: Mass mobilization over time in Tunisia as measured by *v2cademmob_osp* (top) and the MMAD (bottom).

Figure A.2: Mass mobilization over time in Venezuela as measured by *v2cademmob_osp* (top) and the MMAD (bottom).

	Model 1 Pooled	Model 2 TW-FE	Model 3 FD	Model 4 Lagged DV
Mobilization for democracy	0.02***	0.01***	0.01**	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mobilization for Autocracy	−0.06***	−0.07***	−0.02***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP per capita (log)	0.04***	−0.01	−0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP growth rate	−0.06	−0.01	0.03**	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gas and oil production (log)	−0.00*	0.00***	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Population (log)	0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.00)
Avg. years of education	0.02***	0.01*	0.03**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.01	−0.03	0.04	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.00)
Intrastate conflict	−0.05***	−0.02	−0.00	−0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ruling party dimension	−0.29***	−0.21***	−0.10	−0.01**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.00)
Military dimension	−0.33***	−0.35***	−0.10***	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Hereditary dimension	−0.51***	−0.09*	−0.03	−0.02***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.00)
Democracy (lag)				0.96***
				(0.01)
R^2	0.72	0.46	0.10	0.97
Adj. R^2	0.72	0.45	0.09	0.97
Num. obs.	6193	6193	6070	6193

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.1: Main results I: linear panel regression models. Dependent variable: electoral democracy index. All independent variables lagged by one year. Robust standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Mobilization for autocracy	−0.65***	−0.43**	−0.44	−0.25
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.29)	(0.39)
Mobilization for democracy	0.42**	0.34*	0.66*	0.76*
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.32)
Democracy before episode		11.35***	9.18***	11.98***
		(1.72)	(2.28)	(2.90)
Episode duration		0.33***	0.51***	0.39***
		(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Episode duration (squared)		−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time trend		−0.04*	0.04	0.04
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Time trend (squared)		0.00†	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per capita (log)				−0.82
				(0.66)
GDP growth rate				−4.04
				(2.71)
Population (log)				−0.80*
				(0.37)
Avg. years of education				0.59†
				(0.34)
Ruling party dimension				−1.51
				(2.27)
Military dimension				−1.16
				(1.08)
Hereditary dimension				3.47
				(2.56)
Country dummies	no	no	yes	yes
Log Likelihood	−207.37	−149.71	−78.18	−53.98
AIC	420.75	315.42	472.35	357.95
BIC	432.22	346.00	1076.39	792.51
Num. obs.	338	338	338	239

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.1$

Table A.2: Main results II: logistic regression models. Dependent variable: democratic transition. Unit of analysis is the episode. Sample includes only liberalization episodes in autocracies. All independent variables lagged by one year. Clustered standard errors at the country-level.

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Mobilization for autocracy	0.51†	0.63†	−1.12	0.64*
	(0.29)	(0.33)	(1.45)	(0.31)
Mobilization for democracy	−0.42	−0.22	−0.30	−0.18
	(0.36)	(0.39)	(1.10)	(0.49)
Democracy before episode		−9.48**	−10.40	−11.89**
		(3.68)	(8.64)	(4.13)
Episode duration		0.25	0.13	0.32
		(0.29)	(0.40)	(0.36)
Episode duration (squared)		−0.01	0.00	−0.01
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time trend		0.03	0.02	−0.04
		(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Time trend (squared)		−0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per capita (log)				−0.61
				(0.67)
GDP growth rate				−25.22†
				(14.39)
Population (log)				0.24
				(0.20)
Avg. years of education				0.22
				(0.22)
Ruling party dimension				−4.03
				(4.91)
Military dimension				1.40
				(3.27)
Hereditary dimension				−8.73
				(7.21)
Country dummies	no	no	yes	yes
Log Likelihood	−23.00	−18.95	−18.51	−11.73
AIC	52.00	53.90	155.03	53.46
BIC	58.57	71.41	284.21	82.14
Deviance	46.00	37.90	37.03	23.46
Num. obs.	66	66	66	50

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^*p < 0.05$; $^\dagger p < 0.1$

Table A.3: Main results III: logistic regression models. Dependent variable: democratic breakdown. Unit of analysis is the episode. Sample includes only democratic regression episodes. All independent variables lagged by one year. Clustered standard errors at the country-level.

	Model 13 Pooled	Model 14 TW-FE	Model 15 FD	Model 16 Lagged DV
Mobilization for democracy	0.02***	0.01***	0.01**	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mobilization for Autocracy	−0.05***	−0.06***	−0.02***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP per capita (log)	0.01	−0.02*	−0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
GDP growth rate	−0.07	−0.02	0.03**	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gas and oil production (log)	−0.00*	0.00***	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Population (log)	0.02***	0.03	0.03	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.00)
Avg. years of education	0.02***	0.01***	0.03**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.03*	0.02	0.03	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.00)
Intrastate conflict	0.04***	−0.00	0.00	−0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Election	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coup attempt	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Human rights protection	0.08***	0.02***	0.03***	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ruling party dimension	−0.25***	−0.20***	−0.08	−0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.00)
Military dimension	−0.28***	−0.34***	−0.10***	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Hereditary dimension	−0.47***	−0.07*	−0.03	−0.02***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.00)
Democracy (lag)				0.95***
				(0.01)
R^2	0.78	0.48	0.12	0.98
Adj. R^2	0.78	0.46	0.11	0.98
Num. obs.	6086	6086	5963	6086

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.4: Main results including control variables for elections, coup attempts, and human rights protection: linear panel regression models. Dependent variable: electoral democracy index. All independent variables lagged by one year. Robust standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).